Consider the normal form game G. L C R T (5,5) (3,10) (0,4) M (10,3) (4,4) (-2,2) B (4,0) (2,-2)| (-10,-10) Let Go (8) denote the game in which the game G is played by the same players at times 0, 1, 2, 3, ... and payoff streams are evaluated using the common discount factor 8 € (0,1). a. For which values of d is it possible to sustain the vector (5,5) as a subgame per- fect equilibrium payoff, by using Nash reversion (playing Nash eq. strategy infinitely, upon a deviation) as the punishment strategy. b. Let d - 4/5, and design a simple penal code (as defined in class) that would sustain the payoff vector (5,5).