Cournot duopoly model: 2 firms simultaneously choose quantities 91, 92. The price per unit is P(q1, 92) = 1 - (91 +92). Assume that both firms have a constant marginal cost of zero. Consider the following modification of the Cournot game: Firm 1 is a 'maximizing' type, i.e. firm 1 aims to maximize his profit. Firm 2 is a 'satisficing' type, i.e. given the quantity choice of firm 1, firm 2 aims to maximize q2 as far as firm 2 receives a profit of at least *. If q₁ is chosen so that firm 2 can never reach a profit of T*, then firm 2 only aims to maximize his profit. At the Nash equilibrium of this modified Cournot game for * = 1/2, firm 2 produces strictly more than firm 1.