Consider a repeated game with an infinite time horizon. There are N(2 2) firms producing a homogeneous product. These firms à la Bertrand every period. The aggregate demand function in each period is P-54-3Q. Each firm has a const function of C(q-64 Firms' discount factor is B. Let QM and let qM- be total output in a period under monopoly Suppose the firms use the following trigger strategies. Each firmi chooses qM in the first period. It further chooses qM in subsequent periods if no deviation from qM has been observed. Otherwise it competes in Bertrand fashion. The technology of detecting a deviation from qM is not perfect: there is a time lag of T periods before firms observe other players' previous choices. For example, if a firm chooses something other than ạM in period 1, the punishment for this deviation will take place in period T+2 Under what conditions on ß, T, and N, can this trigger strategy support the monopoly allocation? Does a higher ß make this tacit collusion easier to sustain? Does a higher T make it easier? What about N?