Consider the department store market in Sydney. Two players, David Jones and MYER, are deciding the prices for their new seasonal collection. They could choose either high or low pricing strategy. The payoffs are given by the following table. The first payoff is for David Jones.
MYER
David Jones
Low
High
Low
6,6
7,4
High
4,8
8,9
5. If David Jones and MYER decide simultaneously, which of the following is true?
a) There are two Nash equilibria in this game.
b) There is no Nash equilibrium.
c) Both shops have a dominant strategy to high pricing strategy.
d) There is a unique Nash equilibrium.
e) None of the other answers is correct.
6. After David Jones has already printed their catalogue and committed to its price, MYER observes its rival’s choice and makes its own decision to price Low or High, which one is subgame perfect equilibrium?
I. (High; High if High)
II. (High; High if High and Low if Low)
III. (Low; Low if Low and High if High)
IV. (Low; High if Low)
Group of answer choices
There are no subgame perfect equilibria in this game
a) Only I
b) Only II
c) Only III and IV
d) Only I and II